Analysis Highlights Gulf Energy Supply Risks Across Hormuz and Alternative Export Routes

In an analytical commentary published by Eurasia Review, observer Altaf Moti stated that the ongoing war involving Iran, Israel, and the United States has altered the Gulf's operating environment, transforming predictable transit routes into a network of exposed infrastructure targets. The analysis argues that the historic assumption that regional oil and gas would reliably reach international markets is facing severe structural challenges.

Prior to the current conflict, approximately 20 million barrels per day of oil and refined products transited the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for nearly one-quarter of global seaborne crude trade. The author noted that bypass corridors have also proved vulnerable, highlighting that Saudi Arabia had to temporarily shut down its 1,200-kilometre East-West pipeline following drone strikes on associated facilities. The pipeline had been moving four to five million barrels per day, representing roughly 4 to 5 percent of global supply.

Liquefied natural gas faces even steeper hurdles due to a lack of pipeline alternatives, according to the article. Citing International Energy Agency estimates, the author reported that Qatar and the UAE together account for almost 20 percent of global LNG exports transiting Hormuz. Concurrently, security risks along Yemen's Red Sea coast near the Bab al-Mandeb strait have limited the viability of western maritime corridors.

The article emphasized that Asian buyers face the greatest exposure, as countries including China, India, Japan, and South Korea constitute the primary destinations for energy flowing through Hormuz. In addition to physical risks, rising war-risk insurance premiums, heightened freight costs, and scheduling uncertainty are altering the underlying economics of energy shipping and feeding global inflationary pressures.

While regional governments including the UAE are working to expand alternative trade corridors, pipelines, and rail networks to reduce dependence on single maritime checkpoints, the author noted that infrastructure diversification requires years, whereas security risks can disrupt transport links much more rapidly.